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Ewa Plonowska Ziarek  
University of Buffalo 
There are two interrelated questions that I would like to explore in the 
context of Pleshette DeArmitt’s work. The first one pertains to the 
intellectual stakes of the eloquent style of her writing, its elegance and 
playfulness, which accompanies the philosophical order of argumentation. 
And the second one refers to the issue of female friendship. How can one 
discuss such friendship without resorting to merely biographical, historical, 
or autobiographical terms? If I could write an essay in honor of Pleshette 
DeArmitt and her work, I would call it “De Copia: In Praise of Female 
Friendship.” Yet what kind of philosophical theories of female friendship 
could I possibly refer to? Perhaps to none. DeArmitt, whose life has created 
so many friendships, did not live long enough to write about friendship, at 
least not directly. And yet I would like to suggest that her captivating—the 
adjective that I use here deliberately—book, The Right to Narcissism: A Case 
for Im-possible Self-Love, leaves us traces of female friendship in her 
philosophical argument that narcissistic self-love is inseparable from the 
love of another.1 Is this argument a sufficient starting point to talk about 
friendship among women? Or does it require a narrative and stylistic 
supplement to her philosophical case, which, as the title of The Right to 
Narcissism suggests, is also intertwined with an ethical, political, and legal 
case? What kind of tale is told by a woman philosopher, who, as Adriana 
Cavarero suggests, is also gifted with a certain ability of storytelling?2  
After articulating the philosophical and ethical stakes of her revision of 
narcissism, DeArmitt, whose work is haunted by grief and mourning, 
nonetheless very quickly promises us something different, namely, that she 
will take us on an adventure which perhaps will be better expressed in 
narrative form. As she puts it, “we will sketch out the adventures of self-
love.”3 These adventures begin with her discussion of three scenes; from 
Rousseau’s the Second Discourse, from Kristeva’s Nations without Nationalism, 
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and from Derrida’s Rogues. She invites us to read these cases of the familiar 
condemnations of narcissism, only to ask us to consider whether other tales 
of narcissism are possible: “Yet, this is only one version of Rousseau’s 
famous morality tale. What if there were another?”4 And again, “Kristeva, as 
we will see, will offer another narrative about narcissism, one in which a 
right to a healthy self-love would not be opposed to a right to otherness.”5 
The proliferation of narcissisms discussed in this compact, elegantly 
written text—from solipsism to ecstatic transport toward the other; from bad 
to good narcissism; from primary to secondary; from the narcissism of life to 
the narcissism of death (to borrow André Green’s formulation); from the 
narcissism of mourning to the narcissism of love—also requires multiple 
genres of writing, including an incredible virtuosity of foot work at the end. 
Echoing Sarah Kofman,6 these multiple philosophical, stylistic, and narrative 
registers of a woman’s claim to “im-possible self-love” take issue with 
Freud’s suspicion that women, though narcissistically wounded, already 
have too much of narcissism. Indeed, the question of the imbalance—excess 
or privation—of narcissism is the main concern of this book, which seems to 
suggest that finding the right dose, in the therapeutic and ethical senses of 
the word, is a difficult or impossible task, especially when women’s rights 
are concerned. 
In its rhetorical structure, the book dramatizes the predicament of a 
woman philosopher, who, like Echo, has no assurance that her text will be 
heard, and therefore must deploy all her eloquence in order to inaugurate a 
new story out of the limited resources at her disposal to captivate her 
readers’ curiosity. In the great tradition of modernist defamiliarization, the 
text begins with a one-liner from Derrida, in which it is hardly possible to 
recognize Derrida: “The right to narcissism must be rehabilitated, it needs 
the time and the means.”7 Indeed this provocative citational repetition is not 
only meant “to raise more than a few eyebrows,”8 especially from the 
Levinasian crowd, but through this defamiliarization, to suggest another 
story. The book’s unfolding is an orchestrated oscillation between patience 
and curiosity, enticement and postponement, until in the end we finally 
encounter the main allegory of a woman’s retelling of narcissism in 
DeArmitt’s retelling of Echo’s story. It is in this allegory that we can also 
hear certain echoes of female friendship. 
The first major clue about an alternative tale of narcissism, which might 
shed some light on female friendship, occurs in a parenthesis, as if it were 
beside the point:  
the traditional notion of narcissism (which is bound up 
with Ovid’s influential myth of Narcissus and Echo, as 
well as with the Platonic distinction between being and 
seeming) undergoes a veritable metamorphosis, in which 
the love of self and love of the other can no longer be 
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thought of as mutually exclusive and must be understood 
as inextricably intertwined.9  
The philosophical argument about the mutual interdependence between 
self-love and the love of the other is inseparable from this parenthetical 
invocation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which introduces for the first time the 
major female character—Echo—in DeArmitt’s argument. Only if there are at 
least two characters and more than one story—Narcissus and Echo, for 
example—does the philosophical argument that the love of the self always 
already depends upon the love of the other make sense. The parenthesis 
smuggles in its protective wrapping Echo, who will eventually displace 
Narcissus altogether. Such displacement occurs in DeArmitt’s rereading of 
Kristeva’s Tales of Love as well as in her invention of Echo as a feminized 
allegory of deconstruction in the last chapter of the book, entitled “The Ear 
of Echo.” Indeed as Kelly Oliver and Elaine Miller,10 among others, point 
out, Echo is the main figure in The Right to Narcissism. From the parenthesis 
to allegory, this oblique movement of the text toward Echo allows us to hear 
another title in the title of DeArmitt’s book. The book could have been called 
Echo’s Right to Love, or Echo‘s Right to Friendship. As we shall see, these acts of 
love and friendship are inseparable from Echo’s, and DeArmitt’s own, 
incredible rhetorical eloquence, for which Echo is ultimately punished.  
The figure of Echo is central in DeArmitt’s engagement with Kristeva’s 
notion of primary narcissism. Even though it precedes the mirror stage and 
the symbolic order, primary narcissism, Kristeva argues, is already a 
triangular, unstable structure in which the emergence of an I is intertwined 
with two forms of alterity: on the one hand, the 
abjection/expulsion/devouring of the maternal body, which is the 
fantasmatic receptacle of the infant’s death drive and magnet of its first 
projective identifications; on the other hand, the identification with, or 
transference to the place of the proto-third, which Freud calls the primary 
“father in individual prehistory.”11 Following Melanie Klein, Kristeva 
suggests that this primary magnet of transference might be better described 
as the fusion of maternal desire and linguistic sounds. In other words, 
“paternal” designates here “the dominant place of language in the 
constitution of being.”12 Needless to say, Kristeva’s notion of primary 
narcissism, which underscores the entanglement of the emerging “I” with 
two forms of otherness, is the crucial theoretical linchpin of DeArmitt’s own 
rehabilitation of narcissism. In both cases, the very emergence of the (not 
yet) subject is a drama of the separation from the alterity of the maternal 
body (or the real) and the transferential movement toward the loving third, 
which is the “composite” figure of the imaginary as well as the semiotic pre-
figuring of the symbolic.13 By inscribing Echo on the level of primary 
narcissism, DeArmitt argues that such an inscription is a necessary 
consequence of Kristeva’s privilege of “orality, vocalization, alliteration, 
rhythmicity”14 in this primary encounter with the otherness of language, 
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which precedes the visual structure of the mirror stage as well as the 
signifying structure of the sign. Since the Kristevan triangular structure of 
primary narcissism implies the infant’s incorporation of the 
maternal/paternal voice, it “will have more in common with Ovid’s Echo 
than the scopophilic Narcissus.”15 As DeArmitt points out, the emerging 
proto-subject, “like or as Echo, catches the words, or simply the sounds, of 
the Other and delights in repeating, reproducing, and sending back the 
music that her ears have caught. In this archaic or primary identification, 
one finds a dominance of the oral—of the mouth, lips, and tongue.”16 This 
oral delightful and playful incorporation of the patterns and sounds of the 
other is, according to DeArmitt, a kind of “primordial echoing.”17  
These joys of primordial echoing persist throughout our lives whenever 
we engage with linguistic play ourselves or appreciate rhythm, style, sound 
patterns, alliteration, or rhyme in the utterance/writing of somebody else. 
Following Kristeva, we can call these aspects of language, which persist 
beyond argument for communication, “poetic,” “semiotic,” and “embodied” 
aspects of the style. Consequently, the figure of Echo inhabits DeArmitt’s 
book in a double way: first, on the level of the argument, Echo allows her to 
pinpoint the specificity of the primary transference, the loving identification, 
and the oral assimilation of the speech of the other—a transference that is a 
condition sine qua non of the emergence of the proto-subject. Second, I 
would argue, Echo persists as the stylistic and rhetorical eloquence of both 
DeArmitt’s and Ovid’s own writing. 
By replacing Narcissus with Echo in the middle of her revision of 
narcissism DeArmitt turns the tables on us, reversing our expectations, 
before she explicitly announces such a reversal in her reading of Derrida:  
The tables have now turned. The words that return to 
Narcissus, the sounds that reach his ears, are no longer his 
own. For Echo’s “voice” has rendered his words foreign 
and unrecognizable, and Narcissus receives them as from 
an other. It is he, Narcissus, who now hearkens to Echo’s 
call to come. . . who is destined to echo her. In this strange 
turn of events, Derrida’s Narcissus seems to be subject to 
the same sovereign injunction that binds Echo.18  
Has DeArmitt just turned the tables on Derrida, rendered his words foreign 
and unrecognizable, while patiently and lovingly echoing his version of the 
story? Has she just invented a new feminist allegory of deconstruction in the 
figure of Echo, precisely “at the intersection of repetition and the 
unforeseeable”?19 In DeArmitt’s own rhetorical cornucopia, Echo “is perhaps 
not simply a figure of a deconstructive self but also an exemplary figure for 
deconstruction itself.”20 This is a rather bold move. What does it mean in fact 
to treat Echo as an exemplar of the whole deconstructive enterprise and to 
select this rather marginal figure out of a plethora of other more prominent 
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tropes, literary allusions, and philosophical texts discussed by Derrida 
throughout his career—for example, Artaud, Hamlet, Kafka, Mallarmé, 
Ulysses, to mention just a few names and titles that have generated 
enormous secondary commentaries in the wake of Derrida’s readings? What 
kind of disfigurations and reconfigurations of the Derridean corpus would 
such a claim entail? Does DeArmitt propose to transfigure the Derridean 
discussions of reiteration, hauntology, immunity, friendship, democracy, 
hospitality, capital punishment, responsibility, etc., as versions of echology? 
This rather long list of questions, for which I do not have answers, is merely 
an indication of an enormous project that the last pages of The Right to 
Narcissism propose. And it is now up to us, her readers and friends, to pick 
up these threads and follow the lines of inquiry DeArmitt initiated.  
The second intervention of DeArmitt’s reading of Derrida lies in her 
interpretation of the role of affect in the transformative acts of repetition. 
Sadness, lament, and despair are some of the affects that both Derrida and 
DeArmitt directly address in their discussions of mourning. But it seems to 
me that DeArmitt’s attention to the affective, or semiotic, resonances of the 
performative speech act is more pronounced, as it no doubt continues her 
reflections on semiotic orality from the chapter devoted to Kristeva’s Tales of 
Love. As DeArmitt reminds us in her reading of Echo, it is not just any act of 
repetition that makes a difference—ethical, political, or interpersonal—but 
rather such ethical transformations implicitly or explicitly, directly or 
indirectly, perform unanticipated declarations of love.21 Following Melanie 
Klein, as well as Kristeva’s interpretation of Klein—and DeArmitt was 
reading and teaching both of these writers—we could perhaps call such 
affective reiterations “transformative acts of reparation.”  And conversely, 
we can easily recall or imagine a plethora of harmful repetitions which 
denigrate, humiliate, mock, or discredit other speakers. When we use the 
other’s words against him or her, these aggressive acts of repetition tear us 
apart. Often conveyed by subtle bodily gestures, an embrace, a hand on 
one’s shoulder, a smile or a hateful stare, these positive and negative 
affects—delight and despair, love and hate, and their unforeseeable, 
unconscious, ambivalent eruptions in repetitive speech acts—constitute both 
a challenge for and a possibility of ethics, since they foreground the fact that 
we are always already affected by an other. These semiotic, affective 
dimensions remind us that ego, as Kristeva calls it, first and foremost 
“affectus est.”22 
How could we credit DeArmitt’s inventive response to Derrida’s 
rethinking of narcissism and mourning? Perhaps we can follow her own 
example here. In her analysis of Kristeva, DeArmitt points out that Kristeva 
gives too much credit to Freud and does not sufficiently acknowledge the 
new directions of her own argument:  
We highlight this point not to discredit Kristeva’s 
assertion that Freud shows us that narcissism is first and 
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foremost a structure but to give credit where credit is due. 
It is, we believe, the force and the creativity of Kristeva’s 
own interpretation of Freud. . . which allows us to 
conceive of self-love “as a primary identity organization” 
that enables the emergence of a subject.23  
Indeed, we should give credit where credit is due: “echology” and 
affectivity disclose the creativity of DeArmitt’s own interpretations of 
Derrida. And the subtle negotiation between Kristeva and Derrida implicitly 
taking place in her book is yet another intellectual adventure that DeArmitt 
promised us in the Introduction. 
However, there is something else at stake in DeArmitt’s generous credit 
of the import of Kristeva’s work. Emphasizing the “originality and 
radicality”24 of Kristeva’s psychoanalytic theory of self-love, DeArmitt’s 
tribute to another female thinker is an act of female intellectual friendship. 
Women philosophers reading other women’s works, finding sustenance in 
the force and creativity of other women’s words, this practice, despite the 
institutionalization of Women’s Studies at the universities, is still a relatively 
new phenomenon, especially in philosophy. And as we know all too well, 
this practice is still too limited and produces its own exclusions, which other 
marginalized women have repeatedly pointed out to white women scholars. 
In addition to these political, ideological, and philosophical limits of 
women’s intellectual friendships, there is also a limit of the philosophical 
tradition and its discourse. This intersection between women’s self-love and 
the love of other women that we call friendship has not yet found its 
philosophical vocabulary. In my search for the echoes of friendships among 
women, friendship which has been so generously given to me by DeArmitt 
and other women at SPEP, I, like Kelly Oliver and Elaine Miller, want to 
follow DeArmitt’s rereading of Ovid’s Metamorphoses from the perspective 
of Echo. As DeArmitt points out in the closing line of her book, Echo’s story 
has to be heard again, and perhaps each time otherwise: “In this allegory of 
Echo, one hears, if one listens well, another narrative of narcissism, which 
does not disavow mourning and opens itself to the experience of the other as 
other.”25 
Encouraged by these words I listen again to Ovid’s Metamorphoses in 
search of another allegory. And what DeArmitt claims for the transformative 
power of love I want to claim for the rhetorical and ethical power of female 
friendship. What seems to be forgotten in the readings of Ovid’s tale, which 
focus primarily on the exchanges between Narcissus and Echo, is indeed a 
story of female friendship that both inspires and calls for women’s rhetorical 
eloquence, for their copia. Such a forgetting structures Derrida’s 
interpretation of Echo as well, in so far as his interpretation foregrounds 
“the intersection of repetition and the unforeseeable,”26 the possibility of 
inauguration out of repetition emerging between Narcissus and Echo. As 
Derrida writes, “everything in this famous scene turns around a call to come. 
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. . ‘Veni!’ says Narcissus; ‘Come!’ ‘Come!’ answers Echo. Of herself and on 
her own.”27 This generous reading, which grants a certain agency to Echo 
despite her predicament of truncated repetition, nonetheless seems to forget 
that Echo was a celebrated storyteller or musician, depending on the version 
of the myth. Like Scheherazade who used her art of storytelling to distract 
the power of the sovereign, Echo deploys her power of language in order to 
save her friends from the law of heteronormativity, its violence and 
punishment. Didn’t she distract Juno, a feminine agent of heteronormativity, 
with her captivating words in order to enable other nymphs to escape the 
punishing wrath of the jealous wife/Goddess, and thus to flee from the 
double misfortune of a possible rape (since divine rape of women is such a 
prominent theme of Ovid’s Metamorphoses) and the punishment for that 
rape?: “when she[Juno] might have caught the nymphs lying beneath her 
Jupiter, on the mountain slopes, Echo knowingly held her in long 
conversations, while the nymphs fled.28 When Saturnia realized this she said 
‘I shall give you less power over that tongue by which I have been deluded, 
and the briefest ability to speak.’”29 
If this part of the story is about “sovereign injunction,” as Derrida 
suggests, if indeed jealous Juno is the figure of the sovereign at all, this 
sovereignty is at least for a short time suspended by the captivating power 
of prudent female speech, by Echo’s “longo sermone”—a term meaning 
conversation but also wisdom, disputation, lecture. By undermining the 
power of sovereignty through her rhetoric, Echo suspends not only the law 
(of heteronormativity) but also the sovereign right to suspend the law as 
well as the right to punish. In other words, she suspends sovereignty itself. 
Thanks to her “sermone,” Echo’s act of friendship enables other Nymphs to 
flee from the jealous vengeance of the Goddess. Indeed, the correlative of 
suspended sovereignty held captive by female eloquence is the figure of 
flight, “fugo,” one the most frequently repeated verbs in Ovid’s tale of 
Narcissus and Echo. For example, Narcissus’s question about Echo’s flight 
from him evokes the successful flight of the Nymphs thanks to Echo’s 
rhetorical power: “Why do you run from me (‘me fugis’)?—asks Narcissus.’” 
When it is Narcissus who flees from Echo, his flight from love is contrasted 
with the Nymphs’ running away from injustice and punishment at the 
beginning of the poem. To stress the poetic import of these different 
modalities of flight in this poem, Ovid not only repeats “fugo,” but in fact 
creates a poetic “Echo effect” of alliteration that calls attention to the 
thematic and rhetorical import of flight in his poem: “He runs from her, and 
running cries.”30 In particular what is at stake in the Echo story of the 
Metamorphoses is the contrast between the flight from love and the flight 
from law, if not from sovereignty itself, enabled by love. 
Thus what interests me in this story of female friendship is not only the 
intersection between “repetition and the unforeseeable,” or repetition and an 
ethical response, which Derrida analyzes, but rather the flight from the law, 
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the suspension of punishment, and the captivation of sovereignty by Echo’s 
rhetorical copia. The allegory of female friendship among the nymphs is after 
all a story about fugitives from the law and the ethical substitution in the 
Levinasian sense, since it is Echo who takes the place of other nymphs and 
receives Juno’s punishment in their stead. As a result of this punishment, 
received for the sake of other women, her rhetorical power, her “potestas,” 
which indeed “outsmarted”31 the law of heteronormativity becomes “parva,” 
very small.32 Consequently, the law and sovereignty attempt to reassert 
themselves through this truncation of female language and its diminished 
rhetorical power. As another great feminist reader of Derrida, Gayatri 
Spivak, in her text, “Echo,” remarks, the story of Echo’s punishment is 
different from that of Tiresias, because it is not supplemented by any gifts 
from Jupiter.33 Echo loses her linguistic potestas but does not receive any 
other compensating gifts or abilities. And perhaps one symptom of this 
diminished potestas is a reframing of Echo’s story within the heterosexual 
encounter with Narcissus. Nonetheless, despite her “parva potestas”, Echo 
still confounds and surprises Narcissus, who is “astonished, and glances 
everywhere,” just as Juno before him was “deceived” by Echo’s voice. 
As Spivak’s deconstructive reading of Ovid reminds us, there are 
significant differences between the original Latin text and its English and 
French translations with respect to the phrases Echo herself repeats directly, 
and the reported speech of the narrator of the poem, who tells us about her 
repetition.34 To put it ironically, different translators put different words in 
Echo’s mouth. These differences matter to our interpretation of the poem 
since the multiple modalities of repetition—for instance, the relation 
between Echo’s truncated repetition and the poetic repetition of sounds 
performed in the language of the poem—constitute the meaning of the text. 
Given the weight that Derrida gives to “à venir” in his reading of Echo, it is 
striking that it is precisely this phrase that is not directly repeated by Echo in 
Ovid’s poem: Narcissus “shouts in a loud voice ‘Come to me!’ She calls as he 
calls.”35 By contrast, Derrida writes, “everything in this famous scene turns 
around a call to come. . . ‘Veni’ says Narcissus; ‘Come!’ ‘Come!’ answers 
Echo. Of herself and on her own.”36 Derrida’s altered reading invents Echo’s 
double response, which is missing in Ovid’s text. It is precisely thanks to this 
inventive rewriting of the original that Derrida, of himself and on his own, 
grants Echo a possibility of the inauguration of speech. Ovid’s lines—“voce 
'veni’… vocat illa vocantem” 37 –are a magnificent example of echolalia and 
alliteration, which incorporates Echo’s altering play with sounds into the 
poetic language of the Metamorphoses. Rather than responding on her own 
and by herself, Echo’s echolalias are appropriated by Ovid’s own poetic 
power. Following many of Ovid’s readers, we can read “vocat illa vocantem” 
as a striking example of Echo’s serving “as a model for the poet Ovid 
himself, her words echoing his own poetic project in the Metamorphoses, 
where he too creatively appropriates, translates and transforms the words 
and stories of others into a text that fully represents his own designs and 
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desires.”38 This echoing effect of Ovid’s poetic language evokes and confirms 
DeArmitt’s reinterpretation of Kristeva’s primary narcissism, which 
precisely stresses the fact that the early delight in echolalia and sound 
patters, a testimony to the oral incorporation of the sounds of language, 
recurs as the semiotic aspect of literary language.  
This discussion of whether Echo is a feminine figure of the inventive 
inauguration of a new speech act out of linguistic repetition, or whether she 
is merely a poetic model of Ovid’s own writing (and thus is an allegory of 
the male poetic language) echoes a long history of protracted and 
unresolved, perhaps unresolvable, disagreements about the status of Echo in 
Ovid’s tale. Is she a “passive” figure of a diminished capacity of female 
speech or is she “a creative force,”39 which, to follow DeArmitt’s reading, 
deconstructs the very opposition between repetition and inauguration? By 
turning Echo into an allegory of deconstruction, DeArmitt does not resolve 
this ongoing debate, but, on the contrary, augments all the contradictions, 
ambiguities, and complexities that this figure presents for us. 
 These ambiguities pertaining to the status of Echo’s utterances in the 
wake of her punishment are reenacted in the last two lines that Echo repeats 
directly in Ovid’s poem. One of these lines, similar yet different to “veni”,40 
reads as follows: “'huc coeamus' . . . 'coeamus' rettulit Echo,”41 usually 
translated as “Let us come together.” The difference between Narcissus’s 
“veni”42 and “coeamus”, which Echo so gladly repeats, is that the latter phrase 
puts an emphasis on togetherness, being with, and coming together. 
“Coeamus” in Echo’s speech act signals both the possibility of an ethical 
relation to the other, being with the other, as well as an erotic sexual 
encounter. In this phrase, ethics cannot be separated from Eros, and Eros 
embraces ethics; indeed they come together in Echo’s speech. It is this 
inseparably intertwined sexual and ethical relation that Narcissus rejects 
with horror, and many philosophers, including Levinas, repeat a similar 
gesture after him. By splitting the ethical and the sexual apart, we are left 
with either asexual ethics or narcissistic love, incapable of a relation to 
alterity. 
Because Narcissus is so confounded (“deceptus”)43 by the unpredictable 
effects of Echo’s repetition, he not only rejects her amorous ethical discourse 
carved out of his own words, but, more importantly, he fails to acknowledge 
the possibility of a shared rhetorical eloquence she offers. This gift of Echo’s 
rhetorical eloquence is also lost in most English translations of the last 
phrase she repeats in Ovid’s text. At stake here is the meaning of the word 
“copia” in the last exchange between Narcissus and Echo—a key Latin term 
almost never rendered in English translations of the Metamorphoses. The 
Latin version of this exchange reads as follows: 
ante' ait 'emoriar, quam sit tibi copia nostri’;  
rettulit illa nihil nisi 'sit tibi copia nostri!’44 
1 0  |  D e  C o p i a  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.703 
When in English translation of these two lines Narcissus says “May I die 
before what is mine is yours” and Echo answers him ‘What’s mine is yours!’” 
in Latin we hear the repetition of “tibi copia nostri!” Resonating in the English 
adjective “copious” as well as in another well-known Latin noun 
“cornucopia,” “tibi copia nostri” refers not only to material plenitude or 
sexual pleasure but also to shared rhetorical and intellectual eloquence. In 
the Western rhetorical tradition, this reference to rhetorical and intellectual 
eloquence in the term “copia”45 is suggested for example by Desiderius 
Erasmus’s famous treaty on rhetoric, “De duplici copia verborum ac Rerum,” 
(“On Copia of Words and Ideas”) or his “A Short Rule for Copiousness” 
(“Brevis de copia praeception”) [1518].46   
By connecting eroticism with intellectual eloquence, Echo’s most 
important act of enunciation47 —“tibi copia nostri!”—takes place not through 
a mere repetition but through a double negation (“nihil nisi”) of Narcissus’s 
curse of death. This eclipse of the threat of death can be read in the context 
of Kristeva’s work as the transformation of the violence of the death drive 
into the linguistic power of the negative. This linguistic eclipse of aggression 
both anticipates the death of the two protagonists and grants them survival 
thanks to the semiotic and rhetorical eloquence of speech. However, I would 
like to suggest another performative effect of Echo’s erasure of Narcissus’s 
curse or perhaps of his unconscious death wish. By omitting “May I die,” 
Echo’s last words—“tibi copia nostri!”—perform the second act of suspension 
in the poem. As we recall, Echo’s story begins with the distraction of 
sovereignty for the sake of friendship, and it ends with the suspension of the 
threat of death—which is after all one of the sovereign prerogatives—in the 
name of love. Not only are these two acts of suspension intertwined, but also 
both of them depend upon different effects of Echo’s eloquence. Echo begins 
by captivating sovereignty by her “longo sermone.” Once this capacity is 
taken away from her, she deploys her truncated repetition in order to 
transform the narcissistic aggression of the death drive into linguistic 
negativity and omission. What these two acts of suspension enable are 
unpredictable, surprising acts of female friendship and acts of love. And 
perhaps friendship is one of the modalities of love. 
These performative acts belong to Echo’s and DeArmitt’s capacious, 
bodily inflected copia, which is transmitted through their words to us, their 
readers. As we have seen, the interplay between “copia” and “corpus”, the 
first word of Ovid’s tale of Narcissus—“Corpus adhuc Echo, non vox erat et 
tamen usum”48—is a crucial theme of the story as well as the stunning poetic 
effect of Ovid’s language. Despite her punishment and the withering away 
of her body, Echo’s enunciation opens the possibility of a flight from 
injustice, of a female substitution, and of a rhetorical/embodied/intellectual 
copia. If, following DeArmitt, I entertain the possibility of a deconstructive 
allegory in Ovid’s poem, it is an allegory of female intellectual friendship 
and embodied eloquence. This allegory is inspired by DeArmitt’s life and 
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work, which has left us such a remarkable legacy of both intellectual 
eloquence and life-sustaining friendships.  
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